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the long credit crunch that began in the atlantic world in august 2007 is strange in its extraordinary scope and intensity. Mainstream discourse, referring to a ‘sub-prime’ crisis, implies that the credit 
crunch has been caused, rather than triggered, by a bubble in the real 
economy. this is at best naïve: after all, the bursting of an equally large 
bubble in the spanish housing market led to no such blow-out in the 
domestic banking system.1 the notion that falling house prices could shut 
down half of all lending in the us economy within a matter of months—and 
not just mortgages, but car loans, credit-card receivables, commercial paper, 
commercial property and corporate debt—makes no sense. In quantitative 
terms this amounted to a credit shrinkage of about $24 trillion dollars, nearly 
double us GdP.2 erstwhile lenders were soon running not just from sub-
prime securities but from the supposedly safest debt of all, the ‘super senior’ 
category, whose price by the end of 2007 was a tenth of what it had been just a 
year before.3 
an understanding of the credit crunch requires us to transcend the 
commonsense idea that changes in the so-called real economy drive outcomes 
in a supposed ﬁnancial superstructure. Making this ‘epistemo logical break’ is 
not easy. one reason why so few economists saw a crisis coming, or failed to 
grasp its scale even after it had hit, was that their models had assumed both 
that ﬁnancial systems ‘work’, in the sense of efﬁciently aiding the operations 
of the real economy, and that ﬁnancial trends themselves are of secondary 
signiﬁcance.4 thus the assumption that the massive bubble in oil prices 
between the autumn of 2007 and the summer of 2008 was caused by supply-
and-demand factors, rather than by ﬁnancial operators who, reeling from the 
onset of the crisis, blew the price from $70 a barrel to over $140 in less than a 
year, before letting the bubble burst last June; a cycle with hugely negative ‘real 
econ omy’ effects. similar explanations were tendered for soaring commodity 
prices over the same period; yet these were largely caused by institu tional 
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investors, money-market and pension funds, ﬂeeing from lending to the Wall 
street banks, who poured hundreds of billions of dollars into commodities 
indices, while hedge funds with their backs against the wall pumped up 
bubbles in coffee and cocoa.5 
Breaking with the orthodoxy that it was ‘real economy’ actors that 
caused the crisis carries a political price: it means that blame can no longer be 
pinned on mortgage borrowers for the credit crunch, on the Chinese for the 
commodities bubble, or on restrictive arab producers for the sudden soaring 
of oil. Yet it may allow us to understand otherwise inexplica ble features of the 
crisis; not least, as we shall see, the extraordinary growth of sub-prime itself. 
We will thus take as our starting point the need to explore the structural 
transformation of the american ﬁnancial system over the past twenty-ﬁve 
years. I will argue that a new Wall street system has emerged in the us during 
this period, producing new actors, new practices and new dynamics. the 
resulting ﬁnancial structure-cum agents has been the driving force behind the 
present crisis. en route, it proved spectacularly successful for the richest groups 
in the us: the ﬁnancial sector constituted by far the most proﬁtable component 
of the american and British economies and their most important ‘export’ 
earner. In 2006, no less than 40 per cent of american corporate proﬁts 
accrued to the ﬁnancial sector.6 But the new structure necessarily pro duced the 
dynamics that led towards blow-out. 
this analysis is not offered as a mono-causal explanation of the cri-
sis. a fundamental condition, creating the soil in which the new Wall street 
system could grow and ﬂourish, was the project of the ‘ﬁat’ dol lar system, 
the privatization of exchange-rate risk and the sweeping away of exchange 
controls—all euphemized as ‘ﬁnancial globalization’. Furthermore, the system 
could not have risen and ﬂourished if it had not offered answers—however 
ultimately pathological—to a range of deep-seated problems within american 
capitalism overall. there is thus a rational, dialectical kernel in the superﬁcial 
distinction between ﬁnancial superstructure and the ‘real’ us economy. In 
what follows, I will ﬁrst sketch the main elements of the new Wall street 
system, and brieﬂy show how its crisis took such spectacular forms. I will then 
argue that, to understand the deeper roots of the malaise, we do indeed need 
to probe into the overall socio-economic and socio-political characteristics 
of american capitalism as it has evolved over the past twenty-ﬁve years. I will 
raise the possibility of systemic alternatives, including that of a public-utility 
credit and banking model. Finally, I will consider the inter national dynamics 
unleashed by the present crisis and their implications for what I have elsewhere 
described as the dollar–Wall street Regime.7 
I. The new wall street system 
the structure and dynamics of Wall street banking changed 
dramatically in the quarter of a century after the mid-1980s. the main 
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features of the new system include: (i) the rise of the lender-trader model; 
(ii) speculative arbitrage and asset-price bubble-blowing; (iii) the drive for 
maximizing leverage and balance-sheet expansion; (iv) the rise of the shadow 
banking system, with its London arm, and associated ‘ﬁnancial innovations’; 
(v) the salience of the money markets and their transformation into funders of 
speculative trading in asset bubbles; (vi) the new centrality of credit derivatives. 
these changes mutually re-enforced each other, forming an integrated and 
complex whole, which then disintegrated in the course of 2008. We will brieﬂy 
examine each of them in turn. 
Trading models 
For most of the post-war period, Wall street investment banks engaged 
in very little securities trading on their own account, as opposed to trad ing 
on behalf of clients; while the big depository commercial banks shunned such 
activity. But from the mid-1980s on, proprietary trading in ﬁnancial and other 
assets became an increasingly central activity for the investment banks, and 
for many commercial banks, too. this turn was connected, ﬁrstly, to the new 
volatility in foreign-exchange markets after the dismantling of Bretton Woods; 
and then to the opportunities created by domestic ﬁnancial liberalization, 
above all the scrapping of capital controls and the opening of other national 
ﬁnancial systems to american operators. these changes offered opportunities 
for a massive expansion of Wall street trading activity, which would become 
a crucial source of proﬁts for the investment banks.8 the turn towards specu-
lative proprietary trading was pioneered by salomon Brothers, whose arbitrage 
Group was established in 1977 and acquired extraordinary proﬁtability under 
John Meriwether during the 1980s.9 
as well as trading on their own account, the Wall street banks became 
increasingly involved in lending funds for other bodies to use in their trading 
activities: hedge funds, so-called private equity groups (trading in companies), 
or special investment vehicles (sivs) and conduits, created by the investment 
banks themselves.10 such lending, known in the jar gon as prime brokerage, 
was also an extremely proﬁtable activity for the Wall street banks: for many, 
their single greatest earner.11 this turn to the lender-trader model did not 
mean that the investment banks ceased their traditional activities in investment 
banking, broking, fund manage ment, etc. But these activities acquired a new 
signiﬁcance in that they provided the banks with vast amounts of real-time 
market information of great value for their trading activity.12 
trading activity here does not mean long-term investment, Warren 
Buffett-style, in this or that security, but buying and selling ﬁnancial and 
real assets to exploit—not least by generating—price differences and price 
shifts. this type of ‘speculative arbitrage’ became a central focus, not only 
for the investment banks but for commercial banks as well.13 so, too, did 
the related effort to generate asset-price bubbles. time and time again, Wall 
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street could enter a particular market, generate a price bubble within it, make 
big speculative proﬁts, then withdraw, bursting the bub ble. such activity was 
very easy in so-called emerging market economies with small stock or bond 
markets. the Wall street banks gained a wealth of experience in blowing such 
bubbles in the Polish, Czech or Russian stock markets in the 1990s and then 
bursting them to great proﬁt. the dot.com bubble in the us then showed 
how the same operation could be carried through in the heartland without 
any signiﬁcant loss to the Wall street banks (as opposed to some european 
operators, notably insurance companies, eager to proﬁt from the bubble but hit 
by the burst). 
Both the Washington regulators and Wall street evidently believed 
that together they could manage bursts.14 this meant there was no need to 
prevent such bubbles from occurring: on the contrary it is patently obvious 
that both regulators and operators actively generated them, no doubt believing 
that one of the ways of managing bursts was to blow another dynamic bubble 
in another sector: after dot.com, the housing bubble; after that, an energy-
price or emerging-market bubble, etc. this may seem to imply a formidably 
centralized ﬁnancial power operating at the heart of these markets. Indeed: the 
new Wall street system was dominated by just ﬁve investment banks, holding 
over $4 trillion of assets, and able to call upon or move literally trillions more 
dollars from the institutions behind them, such as the commercial banks, the 
money-market funds, pension funds, and so on. the system was a far cry from 
the decentralized market with thousands of players, all slavish price-takers, 
depicted by neo-classical economics. Indeed, the operational belief systems of 
what might be called the Greenspan-Rubin-Paulson milieu seems to have been 
post-Minskian. they understood Minsky’s theory of bubbles and blow-outs, 
but believed that they could use it stra tegically for blowing bubbles, bursting 
them, and managing the fall-out by blowing some more. 
Maximizing leverage 
the process of arbitrage and bubble-blowing requires more of ﬁnancial 
operators than simply bringing together the maximum amount of infor mation 
about conditions across all markets; it also demands the capacity to mobilize 
huge funds to throw into any particular arbitrage play, in order to shift market 
dynamics in the speculator’s favour. 
a striking feature of the new Wall street system business model was its 
relentless drive to expand balance sheets, maximizing the asset and liabilities 
sides. the investment banks used their leverage ratio as the target to be 
achieved at all times rather than as an outer limit of risk to be reduced where 
possible by holding surplus capital. a recent new York Federal Reserve report 
demonstrates how this approach proved powerfully pro-cyclical in an asset-
market bubble, driving the banks to expand their borrowing as asset prices 
rose.15 In their illustration, the report’s authors, tobias adrian and Hyun song 
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shin, assume that the bank actively manages its balance sheet to maintain a 
constant leverage ratio of 10. suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows: 
the bank holds 100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with an 
equity of 10, plus debt worth 90.
the bank’s leverage ratio of security to equity is therefore 
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   Assets Liabilities
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        Debt       90
The bank’s leverage ratio of securi y to equity is t fore
Suppose the price of the securities then increases by 1 per cent, to 101. The 
proportions will then be: securities 101, equity 11, debt 90. So its leverage 
is now down to 101/11 = 9.2. If the bank still targets leverage of 10, then it 
must take on additional debt (‘d’), to purchase d worth of securities on the 
asset side, so that the ratio of assets/equity is: 
The bank thus takes on additional debt worth 9, and with this money 
purchases securities worth 9. After the purchase, leverage is back up to 
10. Thus, an increase in the price of the security of 1 leads to an increased 
holding worth 9: the demand curve is upward-sloping. 
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    110         Equity    11
        Debt       99
The mechanism works in reverse, too. Suppose there is shock to the 
securities price, so that the value of security holdings now falls to 109. 
On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, 
since the value of debt stays approximately constant. 
i.e. d = 9.
   Assets Liabilities
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101 + d  = 10,
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But ith securities at 109, equity at 10, debt at 99, leverage is now too 
high:
The bank can adjust down its leverage by selling securities worth 9, and 
paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, a fall in the price of securities leads 
to sales of securities: the supply curve is downward-sloping. 
A central mechanism through which the investment banks could respond 
to asset-price rises was borrowing in the ‘repurchase agreement’—or 
‘repo’—market. Typically, the investment bank wishes to buy a security, 
but needs to borrow funds to do so. On the settlement day, the bank 
receives the security, and then uses it as collateral for the loan needed to 
pay for it. At the same time, it promises the lender that it will repurchase 
the security at a given future date. In that way, the bank will repay the 
loan and receive the security. But typically, the funds for repurchasing the 
security from the lender are acquired by selling the security to someone 
else. Thus, on the settlement day, the original lender to the investment 
bank is paid off and hands over the security, which is immediately passed 
on to the new buyer in exchange for cash. This kind of repo funding oper-
ation presupposes an asset-price boom. It has accounted for 43 per cent 
of leverage growth amongst Wall Street banks, according to the same 
New York Fed report. Repos have also been the largest form of debt on 
investment banks’ balance sheets in 2007–08.16
The question arises as to why the Wall Street banks (followed by others) 
pushed their borrowing to the leverage limit in such a systematic way. 
One explanation is that they were doing this in line with the wishes of 
their shareholders (once they had turned themselves into limited liability 
companies). ‘Shareholder value’ capitalism allegedly requires the ratio of 
assets to capital to be maximized. Surplus capital reduces the return on 
shareholder equity and acts as a drag on earnings per share.17 But there 
is also another possible explanation for borrowing to the leverage limit: 
the struggle for market share and for maximum pricing power in trading 
activities. If you are a speculative arbitrageur or an asset-bubble blower, 
ﬁnancial operational scale is essential to moving markets, by shifting 
prices in the direction you want them to go. In assessing which of these 
16 Adrian and Song Shin, ‘Liquidity and Leverage’.
17 The rewards of senior bank executives were often linked to changing earnings 
per share. See John Kay, ‘Surplus capital is not for wimps after all’, ft, 22 
October 2008.
109 = 10.9.
10
 
gowan: Editorial 11
bank actively manages its balance sheet to maintain a constant leverage 
ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows: the bank holds 
100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with an equity of 
10, plus debt worth 90.   
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    100         Equity    10
        Debt  0
The bank’s leverage ratio of security to equity is therefore
Suppose the price of the securities then increases by 1 per cent, to 101. The 
proportions will then be: securities 101, equity 11, debt 90. So its leverage 
is now down to 101/11 = 9.2. If the bank still targets leverage of 10, then it 
must take on additional debt (‘d’), to purchase d worth of securities on the 
asset side, so t at the r tio of assets/eq  is: 
The bank thus takes on additional debt worth 9, and with this money 
purchases securities worth 9. After the purchase, leverage is back up to 
10. Thus, an increase in the price of the security of 1 leads to an increased 
holding worth 9: the demand curve is upward-sloping. 
  Ass ts Liabilities
   Securities    110         Equity    11
        Debt       99
The mechanism wo ks in reverse, to . Suppose there is shock to the 
securities price, so that the value of security holdings now falls to 109. 
On the liabiliti s side, it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, 
since the value of debt stays approximately constant. 
i.e. d = 9.
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    109         Equity    10
        Debt       99
101 + d  = 10,
11
100 = 10.
10
gowan: Editorial 11
bank actively manages its balance sheet to maintain a constant leverage 
ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows: the bank holds 
100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with an equity of 
10, plus debt worth 90.   
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    100         Equity    10
       De t      90
The bank’s leverage ratio of security to equity is therefore
Suppose the price of the securities then increases by 1 per cent, to 101. The 
proportions will then be: securities 101, equity 11, debt 90. So its leverage 
is now down to 101/11 = 9.2. If the bank still targets leverage of 10, then it 
must take on addition l debt (‘d’), t  p rchas  d worth of securities on the 
asset side, o that the ratio of assets/equity is: 
The bank th s takes on ad itional debt orth 9, a d with this money 
purchases securities worth 9. After the purchase, leverage is back up to 
10. Thus, an increase in the price of the security of 1 leads to an increased 
holding worth 9: the demand curve is upward-sloping. 
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    110         Equity    11
        Debt       99
The mechan sm works in r verse, too. Suppose there is shock to the 
securities price, so that th  value of security holdings now falls to 109. 
On the liab lities side, it is quity that bears the burden of adjustment, 
since the value of debt stays approximately constant. 
i.e. d = 9.
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    109         Equity    10
        D bt       99
10  + d  = 10,
11
100 = 10.
10
gowan: Editorial 11
bank actively manages its balance sheet to maintain a constant leverage 
ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows: the bank holds 
100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with an equity of 
10, plus debt worth 90.   
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    100         Equity    10
        Debt       90
The bank’s leverage ratio of security to equity is therefore
Suppose the price of the securities then increases by 1 per cent, to 101. The 
proportions will then be: securities 101, equity 11, debt 90. So its leverage 
is now down to 101/11 = 9.2. If the bank still targets leverage of 10, then it 
must take on additional debt (‘d’), to purchase d worth of securities on the 
asset side, so that the ratio of assets/equity is: 
The bank thus tak s on additional d bt worth 9, and with this money 
purchas s securities worth 9. After the purchase, leverage is back up to 
10. Thus, an increase in the price of he security f 1 leads to an increased 
holding worth 9: he demand curve  upward-sloping. 
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    110         Equity    11
       Debt       99
The mechanism works in reverse, too. Suppose there is shock to the 
securities price, s  at the value of security holdings now falls to 109. 
On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, 
since the val e of debt tays approximately constant. 
i.e. d = 9.
   Assets Liabilities
   Securities    109         Equity    10
        Debt       99
101 + d  = 10,
11
100 = 10.
10
estudos avançados 23 (65), 200954
the bank can adjust down its leverage by selling securities worth 9, and 
paying down 9 worth of debt. thus, a fall in the price of securities leads to 
sales of securities: the supply curve is downward-sloping. 
a central mechanism through which the investment banks could 
respond to asset-price rises was borrowing in the ‘repurchase agreement’—or 
‘repo’—market. typically, the investment bank wishes to buy a security, but 
needs to borrow funds to do so. on the settlement day, the bank receives 
the security, and then uses it as collateral for the loan needed to pay for it. at 
the same time, it promises the lender that it will repurchase the security at a 
given future date. In that way, the bank will repay the loan and receive the 
security. But typically, the funds for repurchasing the security from the lender 
are acquired by selling the security to someone else. thus, on the settlement 
day, the original lender to the investment bank is paid off and hands over the 
security, which is immediately passed on to the new buyer in exchange for 
cash. this kind of repo funding oper ation presupposes an asset-price boom. It 
has accounted for 43 per cent of leverage growth amongst Wall street banks, 
according to the same new York Fed report. Repos have also been the largest 
form of debt on investment banks’ balance sheets in 2007–08.16 
the question arises as to why the Wall street banks (followed by 
others) pushed their borrowing to the leverage limit in such a systematic 
way. one explanation is that they were doing this in line with the wishes 
of their shareholders (once they had turned themselves into limited liability 
companies). ‘shareholder value’ capitalism allegedly requires the ratio of assets 
to capital to be maximized. surplus capital reduces the return on shareholder 
equity and acts as a drag on earnings per share.17 But there is also another 
possible explanation for borrowing to the leverage limit: the struggle for 
market share and for maximum pricing power in trading activities. If you are a 
speculative arbitrageur or an asset-bubble blower, ﬁnancial operational scale is 
essential to moving markets, by shifting prices in the direction you want them 
to go. In assessing which of these pressures—shareholder power or pricing 
power—drove the process, we should note how ready the treasury, Fed and 
Wall street executives have been to crush shareholder interests during the 
credit crunch, yet how resolutely they sought to protect the levels of leverage of 
the bulge-bracket banks during the bubble. By all accounts, Citigroup’s turn 
to maximum balance-sheet and leverage expansion for trading activities derived 
not from shareholder pressure, but from the arrival there of Robert Rubin after 
his stint as us treasury secretary.18 
Shadow banking 
the drive for scale and for increasing leverage leads on to another 
basic feature of the new Wall street system: the drive to create and expand 
a shadow-banking sector. Its most obvious features were the new, entirely 
unregulated banks, above all the hedge funds. these have had no speciﬁc 
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functional role—they have simply been trader-banks free of any regula tory 
control or transparency in their speculative arbitrage. Private equity groups 
have also been, in essence, shadow trading banks, specializing in the buying 
and selling of companies. special Investment vehicles (sivs) and conduits are 
similarly part of this system. In the words of the direc tor of regulation at 
spain’s central bank, these sIvs and conduits ‘were like banks but without 
capital or supervision’. Yet, as a Financial times report noted: ‘In the past two 
decades, most regulators have encouraged banks to shift assets off their balance 
sheets into sIvs and conduits.’ 19 
the shadow banking system was not in competition with the regulated 
system: it was an outgrowth of it. the regulated commercial and invest ment 
banks acted as the prime brokers of the shadow banking operators, thereby 
gaining very large proﬁts from their activities. this increasingly central feature 
of ofﬁcial bank activity was, in reality, a way of massively expanding their 
balance sheets and leverage. to tap the Wall street banks for funding, the 
hedge funds had to hand over collateral; but through a practice known as 
rehypothecation, a proportion of these collateral assets could then be used 
by the prime broker as its own collateral for raising its own funds. the result 
was the self-ﬁnancing of hugely proﬁtable prime brokerage activities by the 
Wall street banks, on a vast scale, without any extra commitment of their 
own capital: an ingenious way of greatly enlarging their leverage ratios.20 the 
debate about whether deregulation or reregulation in the ﬁnancial sector has 
been occurring since the 1980s seems to miss the point that there has been 
a combination of a regulated and an unregulated shadow system, working 
dynamically together. 
shadow banking refers not only to institutional agents, like hedge 
funds, but also to the practices and products which allowed the investment 
banks to expand their leverage. since the late 1990s an increasingly important 
part of this side of shadow banking has been the ‘over-the counter’ credit 
derivatives market, notably collateralized debt obligations (Cdos) and 
credit default swaps (Cdss). the most obvious attraction of these lay in 
the regulatory arbitrage they offered, enabling banks to expand leverage.21 
traditionally banks had to insure their credit opera tions and such insurance 
entailed supplying collateral. the beauty of Cdss lay in the fact that, as 
shadowy ‘over-the-counter’ products, they did not require the commitment of 
appropriate tranches of capital as collat eral, and thus facilitated more leverage. 
Cds expansion began on a major scale after derivatives specialists from jp 
Morgan Chase persuaded aig to start writing them on Cdos in 1998.22 
Cdos were also a clever solution to leverage problems. By acquiring large 
quantities of securitized loans and thus greatly expanding their balance sheets, 
banks should have expanded their equity base. But Cdos famously bundled 
together dozens or hundreds of such loans, of very varied quality, enabling 
the banks to increase their leverage. the Cdos were typically written by the 
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rating agencies, for a fee, and then given a triple a rating by the same agency, 
for a second fee. such ratings allowed the banks’ equity commitments to be 
minimized. these securi tized loans—mainly from the housing market, but 
also from credit-card debt and car loans—offered investors far higher rates of 
return than they could get in the money markets. the crucial point about these 
so-called ‘structured securities’ was not that they were securitized loans: these 
could in principle be perfectly safe; after all, a bond is, in reality, nothing but 
a securitized loan. But bonds have a clearly identiﬁable source, in an economic 
operator whose credit-worthiness and cash-ﬂow capacities can be assessed; they 
also have clear prices in the secondary bond mar kets. the products bundled in 
Cdos, however, came from hundreds of thousands of unidentiﬁable sources, 
whose credit-worthiness and cash-ﬂow capacity was not known; they were sold 
‘over the counter’, without any secondary market to determine prices, far less 
an organized mar ket to minimize counterparty risk. In short, they were at best 
extremely risky because more or less totally opaque to those who bought them. 
at worst they proved a scam, so that within a few months of late 2007 the 
supposedly super-safe super-senior debt tranches within such Cdos were being 
downgraded to junk status. 
Leverage restrictions were also removed through public policy. 
Hank Paulson achieved a notable success in this area in 2004 when, as head 
of Goldman sachs, he led the Wall street campaign to get the securities 
and exchange Commission to agree to relax the so-called ‘net capital 
rule’, restricting leverage for large investment banks. Henceforth, ﬁrms 
were effectively allowed to decide their own leverage on the basis of their 
risk models. the result was a rapid rise in the big banks’ leverage ratios.23 
Importantly it enabled them to transfer their capital base to new activi ties, 
such as collateralized debt obligations, which subsequently became such a 
signiﬁcant element in their trading activities. 
London’s role 
all these shifts are grouped under the euphemistic heading of ‘ﬁnancial 
innovation’—changes in institutional arrangements, products, oversight 
structures, enabling Wall street banks to escape regulatory restrictions and 
expand their activities and proﬁts. dozens of shifts of this sort could be 
documented. But one of the most fundamental was the construction of a 
large, new shadow banking system in London, alongside the ‘ofﬁcial’ regulated 
sector. By the early 1990s the american investment banks had wiped out their 
London counterparts and dominated the square Mile’s asset markets, with 
the City acquiring an increasingly ‘wimbledonized’ role within the new Wall 
street system.24 Gordon Brown institutionalized the new relationship in 1997 
by creating the uniﬁed Financial services authority, which claimed to operate 
according to ‘principles’ rather than binding rules: one central principle was 
that the Wall street banks could regulate themselves. London thus became 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 57
for new York something akin to what Guantánamo Bay would become for 
Washington: the place where you could do abroad what you could not do back 
home; in this instance, a location for regulatory arbitrage. 
the term ‘Wall street’ should therefore be understood to include 
London, as a satellite for these american operators.25 together London and 
new York dominate the issue of new shares and bonds. they are the centre 
of the foreign-exchange markets. Most signiﬁcantly they have dominated the 
sale of over-the-counter derivatives, which make up the overwhelm ing bulk 
of derivatives sales.26 In 2007, the uk had a global share of 42.5 per cent of 
derivatives based on interest rates and currencies, with the us handling 24 
per cent. In terms of credit-derivatives trading, the us handled 40 per cent in 
2006, while London handled 37 per cent (down from 51 per cent in 2002). 
Funding speculation 
the enormous expansion in the activities of the Wall street banks and 
their shadow system required ever-larger amounts of funding. such funding 
was classically supplied by the recycling of retail savings sitting in deposit 
accounts and, even more importantly, by the commer cial banks creating large 
supplies of credit money. But in post-1980s america such retail savings were 
minuscule—a point to which we will return—and credit money from the 
commercial banks, though signiﬁ cant, was soon hopelessly inadequate. In 
these circumstances the trader banks turned to the wholesale money markets. 
at the heart of such markets were the inter-bank markets, with interest rates 
on, or just a few basis points above, the Fed’s policy rates. Historically these 
markets were used to ensure that the banks were able to clear smoothly on 
a daily basis, rather than as a source of new, large-scale funding, let alone 
funding of a speculative nature. there was also the commercial-paper market, 
typically used by the big corporations for short-term funding, again principally 
to smooth their operations. 
But in the new Wall street system, these money markets were 
trans formed. they remained centres of short-term lending, but they were 
increasingly funding speculative trading activity. on the supply side, the funds 
available for lending to Wall street were expanding rapidly, espe cially through 
the expansion of pension funds during the 1980s and 1990s. In rather typical 
american style, a small change in the tax code through amendment 401K in 
1980 opened the door to this development. this amendment gave a tax break 
to employees and employers if they put money into pension plans; the result 
was a massive ﬂow of employee income into these plans, totalling nearly $400 
billion by the end of the 1980s. By the late 1990s it had climbed to almost $2 
trillion.27 
at the same time as becoming key sources for the liabilities of the 
invest ment banks through short-term lending to them, the mutual funds, 
pension funds and so forth also became increasingly important targets for Wall 
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street’s efforts to sell asset-backed securities, and in particu lar collateralized 
debt obligations. thus the new Wall street system attempted to draw the fund 
managers into speculative bubble activity on both the funding (liability) side 
and on the asset side, enabling ever-larger balance-sheet expansion. 
II. The causes of the crisis 
It might, in principle, have been the case that the cluster of mutually 
re inforcing innovations which we have called the new Wall street system, were 
responses to the emergence of a housing-market bubble in the us from 2001. 
If so, we would have had a classic Minskian crisis linked to housing. In fact, 
all the key innovations were set in place before the onset of the bubble. Indeed 
there is ample evidence that the Wall street banks quite deliberately planned a 
house-price bubble, and spent billions of dollars on advertising campaigns to 
persuade americans to increase their mortgage-related debt. Citigroup ran a 
billion-dollar campaign with the theme ‘Live Richly’ in the 1990s, designed 
to get home owners to take out second mortgages to spend on whatever they 
liked. other Wall street banks acted in a similar fashion, with a great deal of 
success: debt in second mortgages climbed to over $1 trillion in a decade. 
But the bubble that generated the credit crunch of 2007 lay not 
only—or even mainly—in the housing market, but in the ﬁnancial system 
itself. the crisis was triggered not only by the scale of the debt bubble, but 
by its forms. In a normal over-lending crisis, when banks have ended up with 
non-performing loans (as in Japan in the 1990s), both the location and scale 
of the problems can be identiﬁed without much difﬁculty. But in 2007 the 
debt bubble within the ﬁnancial system was concentrated in over-the-counter 
derivatives, in the form of individual Cdos that had no market price or pricing 
mechanism—beyond the say-so of the rat ings agencies—and which were 
distributed in their tens of thousands between the institutions at the summit 
of the ﬁnancial system, as well as their satellite bodies such as sIvs. once 
this set of debt-accumulation arrangements was shown to be junk, in the two 
Paribas cases in august 2007, the suppliers of credit funding, such as money-
market and pen sion funds, grasped that they had no way of knowing how 
much of the rest of the Cdo mountain was also worthless. so they ﬂed. their 
refusal to keep supplying the handful of opaque Wall street investment banks 
and their spin-offs with the necessary funds to keep the Cdo market aﬂoat 
was what produced the credit crunch. 
the investment banks had initially spread the word that the effect 
of their securitization of debt had been to disperse risk widely across a 
multitude of bodies. But this seems to have been false: the Wall street summit 
institutions themselves had been holding on to the so-called super-senior debt 
tranches, in tens of thousands of Cdos.28 they had been borrowing billions in 
the money markets to buy these instru ments, gaining an interest rate on them 
some 10 basis points above their money-market borrowing costs. to continue 
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to turn that proﬁt they had to keep going back to the money markets to roll 
over their debts. Yet now the money markets were shutting down.29 When 
investors in the money markets ﬂed the recycling of short-term borrowing 
in the sum mer of 2007, the entire pyramid centred on the Cdos began to 
crumble. When the Wall street banks tried to off-load their Cdos, they found 
there was no market for them. the insurance companies that had insured the 
Cdos with Cdss found their market collapsing, too. 
Much remains obscure about the precise mechanisms through which 
the credit crunch acquired its scope and depth in 2007–08, mainly because 
the main Wall street operators themselves sought to obfuscate both the nature 
of their plight and their survival tactics. But it is possible to trace a number of 
phases through which the crisis has passed. First, the attempt by the Fed and 
treasury to defend the investment-bank model as the sum mit of the system, 
by acting as its lender of last resort. second, with the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
the collapse of this effort and disappearance of the investment-bank model, 
producing a drive to consolidate a universal-bank model in which the trading 
activities of the investment banks would occur within, and protected by, the 
depository universal bank. In this phase, the Fed essentially substituted itself 
for the creditor institutions of the credit system, supplying loans, ‘money-
market’ and ‘commercial paper market’ funding for the banks. Between april 
and october 2008 this massive Central Bank funding operation involved 
about $5 trillion of credit from the Fed, the eCB and the Bank of england—
equivalent to about 14 per cent of global GdP. Insofar as this state funding 
can continue without raising serious sovereign credit-worthiness problems, 
the most difﬁcult and dangerous phase of the response to the crisis can get 
under way in a serious fashion. this will involve the deleveraging of the 
biggest banks, now in the context of negative feedback loops from deepening 
recessions. How and when this is achieved will give us a sense of the overall 
contours of the credit crunch. 
Prevailing theories 
Much of the mainstream debate on the causes of the crisis takes the 
form of an ‘accidents’ theory, explaining the debâcle as the result of contingent 
actions by, say, Greenspan’s Federal Reserve, the banks, the regulators 
or the rating agencies. We have argued against this, proposing rather that 
a relatively coherent structure which we have called the new Wall street 
system should be understood as having generated the crisis. But in addi tion 
to the argument above, we should note another striking feature of the last 
twenty years: the extraordinary harmony between Wall street operators and 
Washington regulators. typically in american history there have been phases 
of great tension, not only between Wall street and Congress but also between 
Wall street and the executive branch. this was true, for example, in much of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Yet there has been a clear convergence over the last 
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quarter of a century, the sign of a rather well-integrated project.30 
an alternative explanation, much favoured in social-democratic circles, 
argues that both Wall street and Washington were gripped by a false ‘neo-
liberal’ or ‘free-market’ ideology, which led them astray. an ingenious right-
wing twist on this suggests that the problematic ideology was ‘laissez-faire’—
that is, no regulation—while what is needed is ‘free market thinking’, which 
implies some regulation. the consequence of either version is usually a rather 
rudderless discussion of ‘how much’ and ‘what kind’ of regulation would 
set matters straight.31 the problem with this explanation is that, while the 
new Wall street system was legit imated by free-market, laissez-faire or neo-
liberal outlooks, these do not seem to have been operative ideologies for its 
practitioners, whether in Wall street or in Washington. Philip augar’s detailed 
study of the Wall street investment banks, the Greed Merchants, cited above, 
argues that they have actually operated in large part as a conscious cartel—
the oppo site of a free market. It is evident that neither Greenspan nor the 
bank chiefs believed in the serious version of this creed: neo-classical ﬁnan-
cial economics. Greenspan has not argued that ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient 
or transparent; he has fully accepted that they can tend towards bubbles and 
blow-outs. He and his colleagues have been well aware of the risk of serious 
ﬁnancial crisis, in which the american state would have to throw huge 
amounts of tax-payers’ money into saving the sys tem. they also grasped that 
all the various risk models used by the Wall 
street banks were ﬂawed, and were bound to be, since they presupposed 
a general context of ﬁnancial market stability, within which one bank, in one 
market sector, might face a sudden threat; their solutions were in essence about 
diversiﬁcation of risk across markets. the models there fore assumed away 
the systemic threat that Greenspan and others were well aware of: namely, a 
sudden negative turn across all markets.32 
Greenspan’s two main claims were rather different. the ﬁrst was 
that, between blow-outs, the best way for the ﬁnancial sector to make large 
amounts of money is to sweep away restrictions on what private actors get up 
to; a heavily regulated sector will make far less. this claim is surely true. His 
second claim has been that, when bubbles burst and blow-outs occur, the 
banks, strongly aided by the actions of the state authorities, can cope with the 
consequences. as William White of the bis has pointed out, this was also an 
article of faith for Bernanke.33 
III. Systemic options 
the real debate over the organization of ﬁnancial systems in capitalist 
economies is not about methods and modes of regulation. It is a debate 
between systemic options, at two levels. 
 – a public-utility credit and banking system, geared to capital accu-
mulation in the productive sector versus a capitalist credit and 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 61
banking system, subordinating all other economic activities to its 
own proﬁt drives. 
 – an international ﬁnancial and monetary system under national-
multilateral co-operative control versus a system of imperial 
character, dominated by the atlantic banks and states working in 
tandem. 
We can brieﬂy look at each of these in turn. 
A public-utility model? 
all modern economic systems, capitalist or not, need credit institutions 
to smooth exchanges and transactions; they need banks to produce credit 
money and clearance systems to smooth the payment of debts. these are vital 
public services, like a health service. they are also inherently unstable: the 
essence of a bank, after all, is that it does not hold enough funds to cover all 
the claims of its depositors at any one time. ensuring the safety of the system 
requires that competition between banks should be suppressed. Furthermore, 
policy questions as to where credit should be channelled are issues of great 
economic, social and political moment. thus public ownership of the credit 
and banking system is rational and, indeed, necessary, along with democratic 
control. a public-utility model along these lines can, in principle, operate 
within capitalism. even now the bulk of the German banking system remains 
in public hands, through savings banks and Landesbanken. the Chinese 
ﬁnancial system is overwhelmingly centred on a handful of huge, publicly 
owned banks and the Chinese government does indeed steer the credit 
strategies of these banks. It is possible to envisage such a public-utility model 
operat ing with privatized banks. the post-war Japanese banking system could 
be held to have had this character, with all its banks strictly subordinated to 
the Bank of Japan’s policy control via the ‘window-guidance system’. the post-
war British commercial bank cartel could also be viewed as broadly operating 
within that framework, albeit raking off excessive proﬁts from its customers. 
But a private capitalist credit system, centred on banks, would operate 
under the logic of money capital—in Marx’s formula, m-m’: advancing money 
to others to make more money. once this principle is accepted as the alpha 
and omega of the banking system, the functional logic points towards the 
Greenspan apotheosis. this has been the model adopted in the us and the uk 
since the 1980s: making money-capital king. It entails the total subordination 
of the credit system’s public functions to the self-expansion of money capital. 
Indeed, the entire spectrum of capi talist activity is drawn under the sway of 
money capital, in that the latter absorbs an expanding share of the proﬁts 
generated across all other sec tors. this has been the model that has risen to 
dominance as what we have called the new Wall street system. It has been a 
generator of extra ordinary wealth within the ﬁnancial system and has actually 
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transformed the process of class formation in the anglo-saxon economies. 
this model is now in deep crisis. 
the second debate centres around the underwriting of ﬁnancial 
systems. Whether public or private, banking and credit systems are inherently 
unstable in any system where output is validated after production, in the 
market-place.34 In such circumstances, these systems must be underwrit ten 
and controlled by public authorities with tax-raising capacities and currency-
printing presses. Insofar as they are minimally public bodies— not utterly 
captured by the private interests of money capital—these authorities will 
aim to prevent crises by trying to bring the behaviour of the ﬁnancial system 
roughly into line with broad (micro as well as macro) economic goals. at 
present, only states have the capacity to play this role. Rule books like Basel I 
or II cannot do it; neither can the eu Commission or the eCB. 
Intriguingly, the atlantic projects grouped under the name of 
‘economic globalization’—the ﬁat dollar system, ending of capital controls, 
free entry and exit of big atlantic operators in other ﬁnancial systems—have 
ensured that most states have been deprived of the capacity to under write 
and control their own ﬁnancial systems: hence the endless ﬁnancial blow-outs 
in the south over the last thirty years. atlantic business inter ests beneﬁted 
from these crises, not only because their losses were fully covered by imf 
insurance—paid for later by poor people in the countries hit—but also because 
they were used as occasions to sweep open the product and labour markets 
of these countries to atlantic penetration. But now the blow-outs have hit 
the metropolitan heartland itself. obviously the atlantic economies will want 
to keep this system going: the practices covered by ‘ﬁnancial globalization’ 
constitute their most proﬁtable export sector. But it is not so clear that the rest 
of the world will buy a formula for more of the same. the alternative would be 
some return to public control, along with public underwriting. this could only 
be achieved by individual national states regaining effective control, via new 
multilateral co-operative systems comparable to those that existed before 1971, 
imple mented on a regional if not fully international scale. 
Here, however, we will focus on the question of why the ﬁnancial 
model centred on the new Wall street system has achieved such complete 
hegemony within american capitalism over the past few decades. this takes us, 
ﬁnally, back out of the ﬁnancial sphere into the wider ﬁeld of socio-economic 
and socio-political relations in the us since the 1970s. Within this broader 
context, we can begin to understand how the new Wall street system’s rise to 
dominance within the us could have been seen as a strategic idea for tackling 
the problems of the american economy. 
Financial dominance as national strategy 
From the 1970s through to the early 1980s, the american state 
waged a vigorous battle to revive the industrial economy, partly through a 
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mer cantilist turn in external trade policy, but above all through a domestic 
confrontation with labour to reduce its share of national income. this 
was the vision of such leaders as Paul volcker; it was assumed that these 
measures would return american industry to world dominance. Yet the 
hoped-for broad-based industrial revival did not take place. By the mid-
1980s, non-ﬁnancial corporate america was falling under the sway of short-
term ﬁnancial engineering tactics, geared towards the goal of enhancing 
immediate ‘shareholder value’. What followed was wave after wave of mergers 
and acquisitions and buy-outs by ﬁnancial operators, encouraged by Wall 
street investment banks who proﬁted handsomely from such operations. the 
legitimating argument that this was ‘enhanc ing industrial efﬁciency’ seems 
scarcely credible. a more convincing case would be that these trends were 
driven by the new centrality of the ﬁnancial sector within the structure of 
american capitalism.35 
a full explanation of this development is, I think, not yet available. 
But the trend produced some structural features of american capitalism that 
have been present ever since. on the one hand, a protected military-industrial 
sector remains intact, funded from federal and state budgets. some high-tech 
sectors, especially in ICt, were also strongly supported by state subsidies in 
the 1980s and 90s, and have involved real new industrial investment, without 
as yet playing a transformative role in the overall economy: the main impact of 
ICt has been in the ﬁnancial sec tor and retail. But the bulk of the american 
economy, on which growth depends, has been marked by stagnant or even 
declining incomes amongst the mass of the population and no growth motor 
from new investment, whether public or private. With the partial exception of 
ICt investment in the late 90s, GdP growth in the us has not been driven by 
new investment at all. as is widely recognized, it has come to depend upon 
the stimulus of consumer demand; yet such household consump tion was itself 
inhibited by stagnant mass incomes. 
this circle was famously squared in two ways. First and most impor-
tant, the problem of stimulating consumer demand was tackled through 
the sustained supply of credit from the ﬁnancial system. secondly, cheap 
commodities could be bought on an endless basis from abroad— especially 
from China—since dollar dominance enabled the us to run up huge current-
account deﬁcits, as other countries allowed their exports to the us to be paid 
for in dollars. the supply of credit from the ﬁnan cial system to the mass 
of consumers through the usual mechanisms of credit card, car debt and 
other loans and mortgages was, however, sup plemented by the distinctive 
mechanism of asset-price bubbles, which generated so-called wealth effects 
among a relatively broad layer. the stock-market bubble of the 1990s raised 
the paper value of the private pensions of the mass of americans, thus giving 
them a sense that they were becoming richer and could spend (and indebt 
themselves) more. the housing bubble had a double effect: it not only made 
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american con sumers feel conﬁdent that the value of their house was rising, 
enabling them to spend more; it was reinforced by a strong campaign from 
the banks, as we have seen, urging them to take out second mortgages and 
use the new money for consumption spending. 
thus the new Wall street system directly fuelled the 1995–2008 
consumer-led american boom, which ensured that the us contin ued to 
be the major driver of the world economy. this was backed by a global 
campaign to the effect that the us boom was not the result of debt-fed 
growth aided by highly destructive trends in the ﬁnancial system, but of 
american free-market institutions. Here, then, was the basis in the broader 
social relations of american capitalism for the rise to dominance of the new 
Wall street system: it played the central role in ensuring debt-fed growth. 
this anglo-saxon model was based upon the accumulation of consumer 
debt: it was growth today, paid for by hoped-for growth tomorrow. It 
was not based upon strengthening the means of value-generation in the 
economies concerned. In short, it was a bluff, buttressed by some creative 
national accounting practices which exaggerated the extent of the american 
boom and productivity gains in the us economy.36 
the role of China and other asian exporting economies in this 
growth model extended beyond their large export surpluses of consumer 
goods to the us. these export surpluses were recycled back into the 
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american ﬁnancial system via the purchasing of us ﬁnancial assets, thus 
cheap ening the costs of debt by massively expanding ‘liquidity’ within the 
ﬁnancial system. the results of these trends can be summarized in the 
following ﬁgures. aggregate us debt as a percentage of GdP rose from 163 
per cent in 1980 to 346 per cent in 2007. the two sectors which account for 
this rise were household debt and internal ﬁnancial-sector debt. Household 
debt rose from 50 per cent of GdP in 1980 to 100 per cent of GdP in 2007. 
But the really dramatic rise in indebtedness occurred within the ﬁnancial 
sector itself: from 21 per cent of GdP in 1980 to 83 per cent in 2000 and 
116 per cent in 2007.37 
IV. Implications 
the ideological effects of the crisis will be signiﬁcant, though of course 
far less signiﬁcant than imagined by those who believe ﬁnancial regimes are 
the product of intellectual paradigms rather than power relations. Yet the 
cant dished out in the past by the us treasury and imf is over. american-style 
ﬁnancial-system models are now grasped as being dan gerous. no less risky is 
the eu banking and ﬁnancial-system framework, which the crisis has shown 
to be a house of cards, even if still standing at the time of writing. the eu’s 
guiding notion is that banking systems are secured by good rules rather than 
by authoritative states with tax-raising powers. this has been shown to be a 
dangerous joke. the whole eu–eMu project has encouraged banks to grow 
too big for their national states to save them, while offering no alternative at 
eu or even eurozone level. absurdly, the single Market and Competition 
rules in the ﬁnancial sector insist on free competition between banks at all 
costs, and proscribe any state aid for them; while if the stability criteria were 
respected, any full-blown credit crisis would necessarily be transformed into 
a 1930s style depression. obviously these rules are for the birds, yet they are 
simultaneously the principal planks of the eu political economy.38 
this crisis of the american and european set-ups will no doubt have 
two intellectual effects. Firstly, to raise the credibility of the Chinese model 
of a state-owned, bank-centred ﬁnancial system. this is the serious alter-
native to the credit models of the atlantic world. the maintenance of capital 
controls and a non-convertible currency—which China has—are essential for 
the security of this system. secondly, as the crisis unfolds, broader discussion 
of the public-utility model seems likely to return to political life, re-opening a 
debate that has been silenced since 1991. 
some predict much more sweeping short-term changes, such as the 
replacement of the dollar as the global currency or the collapse of Western 
leadership institutions within the world economy. a complete debauch ing of 
the dollar by the obama administration could, perhaps, lead to a stampede to 
dump it globally, along with a retreat into regional or narrow imperial trading 
blocs.39 But no less likely could be a temporary strength ening of the use of the 
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dollar over the next decade: a long stagnation in the us may well be combined 
with very low interest rates and a low dollar. this could produce a new 
dollar carry trade, in which everybody borrows in dollars to take them across 
the exchanges into higher value assets. this would produce a strong trend 
towards a decoupling of other exchange rates from the dollar, but it would not 
necessarily undermine the central element in dollar dominance: the readiness 
of other states to accept payments for their goods and credits in greenbacks. 
We are also likely to see the intensiﬁcation of the two basic structural 
trends in long-term credit-debt relations in the world economy. First, the 
creditor relations between the atlantic world and its traditional south in 
Latin america, africa and elsewhere, historically policed by the imf. this 
relationship weakened over the last decade but is likely to be re-inforced in the 
present crisis. second, the contrary debtor relations between the united states 
and the east asian new Growth Centre economies, which are also likely to 
deepen and tighten, particularly between China and the us. this is a power 
relationship in which China (and other creditors) can exercise real political 
leverage over Washington. We have seen this oper ating in both the timing and 
the form of the renationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.40 We will 
see it again as the us treasury seeks buyers of its large new tranches of debt 
in 2009. the east asian econ omies, above all China, will likely become ever 
more critical to global macro-economic trends, while the erstwhile centrality 
of the us will weaken during its long stagnation. the strengthened ﬁnancial 
clout of China and other east asian states could impinge upon the old 
imperial credit-debt relationships between the atlantic world and the south, 
by offering the latter alternative sources of ﬁnancial support. this threat is 
already prompting warnings in the atlantic world for Washington to soften the 
predatory conditions it has traditionally imposed on africa, Latin america and 
elsewhere.41 
But whether this will mean that east asia will start to build new mar-
ket institutional arrangements for the world economy, challenging those of the 
anglo-american world, remains unclear, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the internal 
divisions within east asia; and second, the question of China’s strategic 
priorities at the present time. thus, east asia has an obvious rational collective 
interest in building its own, centralized commodity and oil markets and 
promoting them to world leadership, ending the dominance of London and 
Chicago. such new market frameworks have sprung up, but they are divided: 
one in Hong Kong, one in Japan and one in singapore. as for China, it is 
currently over whelmingly concentrated on maintaining domestic growth and 
carrying through the leap of dynamic capital accumulation from the coast to 
the interior. at present, it is showing not the slightest interest in challenging 
the americans for leadership in shaping the institutions of the world economy. 
thus the us has some breathing space. But such is the social and political 
strength of Wall street, and the weakness of social forces that might push for 
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an industrial revival there, that it would seem most likely that the american 
capitalist class will squander its chance. If so, it will enjoy another round of 
debt-fed GdP growth funded by China and others while the us becomes 
ever less central to the world economy, ever less able to shape its rules and 
increasingly caught in long-term debt subordination to the east asian credit 
matrix. 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 200968
Notes
1  Leslie Crawford and Gillian tett, ‘spain spared because it learnt lesson the 
hard way’, Financial times, 5 February 2008. 
2  the total debt owed by ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial private sectors in the us 
in 2008 has been calculated at $48 trillion. George Magnus, ‘Important to 
curb destructive power of deleveraging’, ft, 30 september 2008. 
3  david Patterson, ‘Central Banks must ﬁnd or become buyers of system risk’, 
ft, 5 February 2008. 
4  For a useful survey of why most economists were completely incapable of 
grasp-ing the crisis, see Chris Giles, ‘the vision thing’, ft, 26 november 
2008. 
5  Javier Blas, ‘Commodities have proved a saving grace for investors’, ft, 6 
March 2008; Chris Flood, ‘speculators give a stir to coffee and cocoa prices’ 
ft, 5 February 2008. that these ﬁnancial operators were able to build and 
burst such bubbles derived, of course, from the fact that the markets for oil 
and commodities are organ¬ized in London, new York and Chicago, with 
rules made to match the interests of american and British capital. as Jeff 
sprecher, ceo of Intercontinental exchange (ice), the London-based market 
whose rules enabled blowing the oil bubble, explained to the Financial 
times, the market’s organizers could not understand why members of 
Congress should want to give up control over this sector by closing ice 
down. ‘view from the top’, ft, 6 august 2008. 
6  Lawrence summers, ‘the pendulum swings towards regulation’, ft, 27 
october 2008. the ﬁgure of 40 per cent actually understates the share of 
proﬁts accruing to the ﬁnancial sector, since these are in part concealed by 
being transformed into huge employee bonuses, to reduce headline proﬁts 
data; one reason for the bonus system that is often overlooked. 
7  For an earlier exploration of these issues see my Global Gamble, new York 
and London 1999. 
8  the bread-and-butter of Wall street investment bank income had been 
ﬁxed (cartelized) fees for trading securities on behalf of clients until 1975, 
when a change in the law limited such fees. at the start of the 1980s, this 
fee income was still greater for the investment banks than proﬁts from 
trading on their own account. But from the mid-1980s, these banks plunged 
seriously into proprietary trading. By the end of the 1990s, trading income 
was a third bigger than income from commis¬sions for trading on behalf of 
others. and some of the biggest banks earned over half their proﬁts from 
such trading. see John Gapper, ‘the last gasp of the broker-dealer’, ft, 16 
september 2008. 
9  on salomon Brothers and the subsequent career of John Meriwether’s team 
in the 1990s, when they constructed ltcm under the sponsorship of Merrill 
Lynch, see Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed, London 2001. 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 69
10 after the enron scandal, sIvs and conduits were initially not allowed to 
engage in active trading on their own account, but this restriction was soon 
lifted.
11 James Mackintosh, ‘Collapse of Lehman leaves prime broker model in 
question’, ft, 25 september 2008. 
12 Philip augar gives a vivid account of how key such informational 
centralization from all the main markets was in giving the investment banks 
a decisive competi¬tive edge over their smaller or non-investment banking 
rivals. see his the Greed Merchants: How the Investment Banks Played the 
Free Market Game, London 2006. 
13 see nasser saber, speculative Capital: the Invisible Hand of Global Finance, 
London 1999. 
14 alan Greenspan, ‘We will never have a perfect model of risk’, ft, 17 March 
2008. 
15 tobias adrian and Hyun song shin, ‘Liquidity and Leverage’, staff Report 
no. 328, Federal Reserve Bank of new York, May 2008. the term ‘leverage’ 
refers to the relationship between a bank’s ‘equity’ or ‘capital’ and its 
assets—the sum that it has lent out. It is usually expressed as a ratio, so that 
if we say that Lehman’s leverage at the time of its collapse was 25, this means 
that for every one dollar of capital the bank had 25 dollars of assets. But this 
ﬁgure of 25 also means that for every one dol¬lar of capital, Lehman had 24 
dollars worth of borrowings—i.e. liabilities. 
16 adrian and song shin, ‘Liquidity and Leverage’. 
17 the rewards of senior bank executives were often linked to changing 
earnings per share. see John Kay, ‘surplus capital is not for wimps after all’, 
ft, 22 october 2008. 
18 see, among others, ‘singing the blues’, economist, 27 november 2008. 
19 Leslie Crawford and Gillian tett, ‘spain spared because it learnt lesson the 
hard way’, ft, 5 February 2008. 
20 James Mackintosh, ‘Collapse of Lehman leaves prime broker model in 
question’, ft, 25 september 2008. 
21 Christina Bannier and dennis Hänsel, ‘determinants of european Banks’ 
engagement in Loan securitization’, deutsche Bundesbank discussion 
Paper series 2: Banking and Financial studies no. 10/2008. 
22 Gretchen Morgenson, ‘Behind crisis at aig, a fragile web of risks. tiny 
London unit set decline in motion’, International Herald tribune, 29 
september 2008. 
23 stephen Labaton, ‘How sec opened path for storm in 55 minutes’, 
International Herald tribune, 4/5 october 2008. In a classic manoeuvre, 
this was dressed up as a turn by the sec towards more regulation of the 
investment banks. From a formal point of view this was right: the sec 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 200970
acquired regulatory jurisdiction over them; but it simultaneously removed 
basic capital-base restrictions. Furthermore, from 2004 onwards the sec had 
seven staff to supervise the big ﬁve investment banks, which had combined 
assets of over $4 trillion by 2007. 
24 theannualtennistournamentin Wimbledon iswidelyconsidered, 
atleastintheuk, to be the reatest in the world; yet for decades there has been 
no British ﬁnalist.
25 there are some very large British commercial banks, but these should 
be distin-guished from the City of London because, while some have 
participated heavily in the new Wall street system, others such as the 
Hongkong and shanghai Banking Corporation (hsbc), by some measures 
the largest bank in the world, and the standard Chartered Bank, have been 
heavily focused on activities in east asia. 
26 the Chicago Mercantile exchange, however, dominates sales of exchange-
traded derivatives. 
27 Roger Lowenstein, origins of the Crash, new York 2004, pp. 24–5. 
this expansion of bank funding for speculative trading through the 
transformation of the ‘whole¬sale’ markets intersected, of course, with the 
ending of capital controls, enabling the growth of international wholesale 
borrowing by banks and the rise of ‘carry trade’ operations, such as that 
based on the yen: banks borrowing in yen, at 0.5 per cent or less, and taking 
the funds into the Icelandic krona, at 18 per cent. the funding of British 
commercial banks, overwhelmingly domestic at the start of the 1990s, had 
become largely based on overseas wholesale lending, to the tune of about 
£650bn, by 2007. 
28 Gillian tett, ‘Misplaced bets on the carry trade’, ft, 17 april 2008. 
29 For a useful mainstream (and apologetic) account of the risks involved in 
Cdos and over-the-counter derivatives like Cdss, see the imf publication 
by Garry schinasi, safeguarding Financial stability: theory and Practice, 
Washington, dc 2006. 
30 there were tensions between Wall street and new York state regulator eliot 
spitzer after the dot.com bubble burst, but this simply highlighted how 
strong was the consensus at a higher level. 
31 References to these kinds of debates can be found in andrew Baker et al., 
Governing Financial Globalization, London 2005. 
32 see Greenspan, ‘We will never have a perfect model of risk’; alan Beattie 
and James Politi, ‘Greenspan admits he made a mistake’, ft, 24 october 
2008. 
33 Cited in John Cassidy, ‘anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the 
Financial Crisis’, new Yorker, 1 december 2008. 
34 though this does not mean that they are all equally unstable. 
35 this is not to say that american industrial production disappeared: it 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 2009 71
remained large, notably in the defence-budget related sector as well as in 
cars, aerospace, ICt and pharmaceuticals. 
36 a series of changes in us national accounting rules from 1995 onwards 
exagger¬ated both growth and productivity ﬁgures. notable here was the 
use of so-called ‘hedonic indicators’. 
37 Martin Wolf, ‘Why Paulson’s Plan was not a true solution to the crisis’, ft, 
24 september 2008. 
38 In addition, Western eu states made an unstated but real precondition 
for eastern enlargement that the new entrants hand over the bulk of their 
commercial banks to their Western counterparts; a remarkable imperial 
move. these Western banks will now wish to starve the eastern eu 
members of credit, as they seek every trick to deleverage and survive. Will 
the eu political authorities intervene in the market to block this? If so, how? 
39 a trend in this direction is evident in the us decision to give special 
treatment to Mexico, Brazil, singapore and south Korea in terms of dollar-
funding support. 
40 the Financial times reported that us treasury secretary Paulson confronted 
the fact that ‘the Bank of China had cut its exposure to agency debt over 
the sum¬mer’ and thus: ‘found himself with a fait accompli. the federal 
government had to give reassurance to foreign investors in agency debt if it 
wanted to avoid chaos in ﬁnancial markets and a run on the dollar. It smacks 
of debt crises past in Latin american countries, where the ultimate pressure 
for a bail-out came from foreign investors.’ John Gapper, ‘a us government 
bail-out of foreign investors’, ft, 8 september 2008. 
41 david Rothkopf, ‘the Fund faces up to competition’, ft, 22 october 2008. 
estudos avançados 23 (65), 200972
peter gowan is a Professor of International Relations at London Metropolitan 
university, england. He is a member of the editorial Board of the new Left Review. 
@ – p.gowan@londonmet.ac.uk
originally published in the new Left Review, issue 55, January-February, 2009.
